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The aim of this article is to identify factors leading to favorable attitudes toward
other people from different social categories. The parts of article reflect diverse levels
of altruism regulation from primary affective responses to the environment, through
social norms, to abstract moral concepts related to good and evil. The latter allow
understanding of the perspective of other people (including those belonging to out-
groups), acceptance of their values and engagement not only in helping behavior but
also in supporting the development of others.
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THE MANY FACETS OF ALTRUISM
When he first used the term “altruism” in a scientific context, August Comte could not have
predicted the staggering career of the concept in humanities, as well as social and natural science,
or the myriad alternative meanings it would spawn. For Comte, altruism denoted a type of social
behavior expressed through living selflessly for the sake of others (Campel, 2006).
Today, the “well-being of others” remains the defining criterion of altruism, but the question
of selflessness is debated. The dispute whether non-egoistic behavior is possible at all is the bone
of contention (Cf. the Cialdini-Batson argument). But even the proponents of the “egoistic” view
are using the term (Cialdini et al., 1981). One attempt to resolve the dilemma of selflessness was
to look at costs, which are sometimes even interpreted as losses (Hamilton, 1964). The point is
that the altruistic actor incurs significant, personal damage when acting for the sake of others.
The import of these costs is supposed to invalidate suspected “egoistic” motivation for altruism
thus defined. Nevertheless, with the exception of kin altruism (where the stakes can be as high as
life or health), reciprocal altruism demands smaller sacrifices, being decidedly less spectacular (as
clearly explained by Wilson, 1975). A more inclusive (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996) definition of
altruism refers to all manner of actions for the benefit of others, some of which do not necessarily
compromise the benefactor’s interests. It is manifested in assistance that carries no costs, in forging
transient alliances, cooperation, sharing something of value with others, offering (anonymously)
something.
Altruism is not limited to helping the disadvantaged. Other actions that tend to be equated with
altruism include expressing positive emotions and empathy. Altruistic motivation is associated
with commitment to values aimed at serving the best interest of others (Reykowski, 1989). The
concept of altruism is so broad as to include species at the lower rungs of the evolutionary ladder.
Some forms of cooperation in social insects as well as birds, are considered the most basic forms of
altruism (Wilson, 1975).
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The present paper deals with the broad definition of altruism,
understood as the dispositional willingness to respond with
positive emotions to others and to treat others, including
strangers, sympathetically. Such sympathy not always translates
to behavioral acts (this is the difference between the concept of
“altruism” and that of “prosocial behavior”).
The purpose of the article is to present various possible
internal dispositions not only innate to particular species or
internalized during the course of socialization, but also shaped
through values generated reflexively by subjects and standards
determining the criteria of good and evil for others, the world,
and even future generations. The paper focus on mechanisms
forming direct or indirect premises of altruism.
REACTIVE NATURE OF THE PREMISES
OF ALTRUISM: PRIMARY, AUTOMATIC
INTERRELATIONS WITH OTHERS
The primary determinants of altruism are innate and universal
and have been shaped by evolution (Wilson, 1975; Burnstein,
2005) and early childhood experiences (Warneken and
Tomasello, 2006). Our insight into their specifics stems
from developmental data and embodiment research. The basic
ability to focus attention on others is reflected in automatically
following the movement of another person’s eyes. Homo sapiens
is the only species to have evolved gaze direction to be easily
perceived by others (due to highly visible, white sclera) and only
humans (already in infancy) use that information, which, in turn,
facilitates the recognition of another person’s perspective – a skill
important for the activation of a person’s altruistic engagement
(Tomasello, 2014). Data reveal that early, non-verbal, bodily
exchange, and communication lead to strong connections
between the child and the environment. The abilities to mimic
and to have synthonic reactions to the affective states of others
have a special importance in the course a lifetime. The neural
basis for these processes is known as “mirror neurons” (Iacoboni,
2005).
Mimicry as an automatic imitation of a partner’s behavior (this
is known as “social glue”) connects people. Empirical findings
have confirmed that mimicry leads to favorable treatment of the
mimicker [e.g., giving larger tips to barmen who mimic patrons’
language and facial expressions: (van Baaren et al., 2003)]. The
mechanism is reciprocal: the mimicker is more positively inclined
toward the person mimicked. Mimicry increases the sense of
interpersonal closeness, reciprocal similarity, and facilitates the
flow of interaction. Mimicry increases the willingness to help, e.g.,
to spontaneously pick up coins dropped “by accident”. Help was
offered both to the mimicker and to bystanders. One of the most
common ways to perform an altruistic act is to donate to charity,
either with your time, your money, or your material goods. The
people being mimicked were more likely to donate to charities
(van Baaren et al., 2004). Further experiments (Stel et al., 2008)
have demonstrated the same mechanism for mimickers. In our
studies we noticed increased donations to charity accompanied
mimicry, even when the mimicker was in no way associated with
the collection (Szuster, 2005).
Peripheral mechanisms triggered automatically during
interaction also allow us to decode others’ facial expressions and
to communicate our own affective states (Dimberg et al., 2000).
The primary, automatic mechanism of affective contagion (e.g.,
as in the experiment where infants exposed to crying responded
by crying themselves – see Simner, 1971) is considered to
be the base for subsequent emotional empathy. It is reactive,
instinctive and it triggers a circular reaction (Hoffman, 2000),
in which a person’s own state is no longer distinguishable from
the suffering of another person. Empathy, based on the affective
mechanism (Hoffman, 1975, 2000), results from the ability to
respond automatically to other people expressing emotions.
Its distinctive feature is the psychological separation of the
perceiver and recipient of someone’s emotion from the individual
experiencing that emotion. The active nature of this process
creates a new quality of altruism responding, introducing certain
“filters” between one’s own and other people’s emotional states
(Baron-Cohen, 2011) and the harm and well-being of others is
not equivalent to one’s own.
Numerous data confirm the relationship between empathy
and altruism, cooperation and just distribution of goods
(Hoffman, 1975, 2000; Eisenberg and Morris, 2001). Priming with
empathy was shown to increase sensitivity to the needs of others
and to promote positive attitudes toward members of stigmatized
groups: AIDS sufferers, homeless people, criminals (Batson,
1997) and minorities (Vescio et al., 2003). Our own findings on
cyberbullying supported the effectiveness of empathy activation
in virtual reality. Priming with empathy reduced the frequency
by adolescents sending comments that compromised their peers.
However, these effects were transient. Empathy was successful in
reducing cyberbullying only when triggered immediately before
the measurement of the behavior (Barlin´ska et al., 2013).
Empathy does not always strengthen altruistic behaviors. This
is particularly true of the affective empathy. Discomfort generated
as a reaction to the suffering of another person produces the
reaction of avoidance, depreciation of the other person (the
concept of emphatic anger – Hoffman, 2000) and even an attack
or an act of aggression. The latter occurs when the sharing
of emotions concerns aggression. In short, the specifics of the
primary mechanisms of altruism are their reflexive, involuntary,
and automatic nature. These mechanisms have limitations. They
require direct contact. However, the memory of such experiences
enables individuals (through mental images) to also respond with
empathy to other persons, irrespective of how distant in space
and time they may be (Hoffman, 2000).
SOCIALIZATION AS THE FUNDAMENT
OF NORMATIVE ALTRUISM
The external world triggers reflexive approach or avoidance
responses. Seeking interaction with others is fostered by the
biological craving for sensory stimulation, without which it is
impossible to maintain homeostasis. Mere exposure to neutral
stimuli (i.e., those that carry no threat) later trigger elementary
positive responses (Zajonc, 1968). Lasting contact encourages
increasing familiarity with the environment and enhanced
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involuntary attachment. However, the main social foundations
of altruism are rooted in seeking contact with others in order
to obtain reinforcement for the purposes of safety, the sense
of belonging and affiliation (Schachter, 1959; Baumeister and
Leary, 1995). A characteristic aspect for this category of altruism
is that the individual’s responses oriented towards other people
are instrumental to that subject’s own needs. Reinforcements
provide a platform for creating a psychological dependence,
which induces the subject to meet external expectations (despite
punishment) and to conform to social norms including those that
require altruism and condemn egoism.
Social norms are instilled through the educational process,
whereby social actors (parents, teachers, peers, in-group
members) verbalize their expectations toward individuals.
However, socialization is also affected by a wide variety of non-
verbal factors operating in the social environment (Hoffman,
2000). They include ways of responding to others, feeling
sympathetic, or antipathetic toward them. These messages may
take the form of microexpressions, and other subtle reflections
of behavior (e.g., distance, physical, and psychological closeness).
Thus, some attitudes, both explicit, and implicit are formed
as a result of socialization (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). The
environment offers behavioral patterns (algorithms) approved in
a given community and the culture prevalent in that community.
The subject repeats them with no need for verbalization. Thus
morality, including the imperative of being helpful, can have
an intuitive nature, associated with the sense of good without
the ability to understand the essence of the principles of acting
properly (Jarymowicz, 2015). Gradually, the range of individual
attitudes depends on what is typical of the groups one belongs
to. Younger children spontaneously express aversion to others,
while older children try to hide it (cf. the Pollyanna hypothesis:
Drozda-Senkowska, 1990). Internalized social norms become
the source for standards of “normal states” (Reykowski, 1989).
Failure to meet them becomes a reason for internal punishments.
More or less conscious realization that helping others is highly
valued in society makes that strategy a norm whose fulfillment
provides gratification and maintains or enhances positive mood,
and reduces the negative one. A series of experiments proved
that following the helpfulness norm can be instrumental in
the affective well-being of the individual (Schwartz, 1977;
Staub, 1979; Cialdini et al., 1981). This, in turn, perpetuates the
motivation to engage in helping others.
Social norms, associated (unconsciously or reflexively) with
self-esteem become personal, which significantly enhances their
control over behavior (Schwartz, 1977). There have been
numerous empirical findings confirming the regulatory role
of self-esteem in inspiring altruistic behavior (Berkowitz and
Daniels, 1963; Karyłowski, 1982; Schwartz and Howard, 1982).
This rule also concerns volunteers who, apart from having higher
self-esteem, are happier, more optimistic and generally more
content with their lives (Piliavin, 2003).
People are usually not consciously aware of these
relationships. Breaking a norm (punishing partner’s mistakes
with electric shocks in an experiment, or lying) increased helpful
behavior in the next task both towards the same person in a
different context (Berkowitz, 1972). In our research, feedback
about participants’ high social competence increased the amount
of memorized data about a person in need and the number of
ideas generated for helping (Szuster, 2005).
In summary: in the course of social development, human
behaviors, including the ones which do not benefit the helper,
are regulated by certain norms. People learn quickly that helping
others is a highly regarded value. Compliance of behavior with
the norm stabilizes affective well-being and is also a means of
maintaining a positive self-image.
CONCEPTS, REFLECTIONS, AND
MORAL VALUES AS BASES FOR
ALTRUISM
As a result of socialization, the individual gains knowledge
(intuitive or verbalized) of what is right and wrong – in terms
of culture-specific prescriptions. The in-group standard contents
of norms such as social responsibility (Berkowitz and Daniels,
1963), sharing and giving, justice or reciprocity (Walster et al.,
1978) are all the factors leading to altruism. Their regulatory
function is associated with anticipated reward or punishment
(sometimes as delayed as salvation after death as a result of living
according to religious teachings). Social approval or disapproval
is the main basis of altruistic acts.
Such normative altruism is often limited to the norms of one’s
reference group, which may be the source of altruism toward the
in-group members, but at the same time a source of prejudice and
hostility toward the out-group. The understanding of norms may
be limited to one’s environment. In the experiments of Piliavin
(see: Reykowski, 1979), donations to single mothers decreased as
a function of physical distance: the most generous donations were
given to mothers from the same town, the lowest to those living in
another state. However, even a much smaller distance can mean
that help is not extended to the person in need lying on the other
side of the street (Staub, 1974).
Intellectual development contributes to increased cognitive
complexity including self and social awareness (Piaget, 1965).
The result is an improved understanding of the world and a
multiplicity of perspectives. Intellectual skills pave the way for
decentration: changing the cognitive perspective from egocentric
to external. This, in turn, may lead to voluntary shifting and
focusing of attention, and to conscious separation of one’s
own and other people’s perspectives. Whether developmental or
situational, shortage of decentration leads to egocentric biases
in the perception of others and the world. The ability to take
the perspective of others significantly increases the potential of
human altruism (Batson et al., 1997). Understanding of social
norms changes and the subject gradually becomes independent
of algorithms imposed by the environment. Filled with individual
content and bound to the Self, norms present one of the most
common sources of Self standards: Ought or Ideal (Schwartz,
1977; Higgins, 1987). This leads to the emergence of new, internal
imperatives for altruistic behavior.
Some mechanisms regulating altruistic behavior are
stimulated when the so-called Ought Self standards (Higgins,
1987) are activated. In many cultures, obligations are limited
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to the requirement of helping others in trouble. This category
of mechanisms should be treated separately from those that
lead to supporting others in their development and improving
their quality of life. They key to their comprehension appears
to be the concept of the Ideal Self, related to moral values.
While social norms and their internalization (in the form of
the Ought Self standards) are essentially “local” and promote
altruism predominantly toward the in-group, moral values
are universal, and, as such, extend the scope of altruism to
out-groups. When intellectual development allows reflective
thinking and understanding of moral values, the subject becomes
able to perceive the state of another person (regardless of
social status and own interests). Cognitive complexity, and
cognitive categories width (Pettigrew, 1979) facilitate openness
to others, reduce prejudice, and promote positive attitudes.
Jarymowicz (2015) argues that cognitive complexity becomes
the determinant of a truly moral behavior if it leads to the so-
called axiological complexity that is the understanding of the
sense of such abstract concepts as human rights or social justice.
The understanding of values expressed in abstract language
requires the involvement of the intellect in reflective thinking.
Once that is achieved, the standards of ideal states become
the point of reference for the states of others, triggering
altruistic motivation, and others are perceived as autonomous
individuals having a value in and of themselves (Reykowski,
1979; Rutkowska and Szuster, 2011). Bolstered by ideals,
altruistic involvement goes beyond restoring what a given
society considers a balance (relieving hardship) and opens
up to supporting development and expanding other people’s
opportunities.
In short: the system of reflective thinking and evaluation
alters the quality of human functioning (Deutsch and Strack,
2006; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015) with regard to understanding
the meaning of abstract concepts referring to moral values in
one’s own life. It increases the accessibility of various criteria of
evaluating the situation of others, including what is generally
understood as goodness. This, in turn, can cause the subject to
get engaged more involved in further altruistic deeds.
CONCLUSION
The article presents three group altruism-building mechanisms
and focuses on the role of their biological, social and personal
(conceptive, reflective) factors. They engage the body, as well
as various parts of the human mind. Each type of mechanism
generates reactions of a different nature.
The first basic mechanisms yield reactive and automatic
reactions. These are universal, bodily mechanisms, which are the
very basis of every type of reaction. Individual differentiation
among them is slight. They constitute the “manufacturer’s
equipment” of the person.
The second type of mechanism is the result of the process
of learning the patterns of behaviors and understanding norms.
They are the source of one’s engagement mostly in the well-being
of one’s “in-group” members.
The last type of mechanism represents the outcome of
intellectual involvement and reflective thinking. They lead to
forming abstract evaluative concepts, which give rise to the
emergence of entirely new standards of world evaluation.
The evolutionary processes to which man is subject are the
very source of the mechanisms’ diversity. In the course of
evolution, human beings have been equipped with automatic,
affective mechanisms allowing them to approach others. This
is the basis of altruism. However, the specificity of human
altruism depends on the development of concepts enabling one to
transcend the face-to-face context, to understand the perspective
of others and to accept their values. Also, through intellect,
anticipation of the interests of future generation is feasible. The
differentiation between ought and ideal evaluative standards
creates a chance to become involved in the development of
another person, and not only to be content with charitable acts.
The knowledge about the sources of altruism mentioned above
falls within the domain of biology and psychology alike. However,
the emerging theories should not be treated as competitive.
Described in terms of various scientific disciplines, the sources
of altruism should be regarded as complementary theories aimed
as explaining diverse forms of engagement in helping others.
From the psychological point of view such an approach to
altruism could be viewed as consistent with the dual mind
theories developed by many researchers (Deutsch and Strack,
2006; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015).
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